If, however, she responds with words that convey no meaning of divorce, such as “I am drinking water,” “I am beating my slave,” or the like, her right to choose lapses, and she is not believed if she claims that she intended divorce by those words.

If she gives no verbal response but performs an act resembling a response, such as moving her belongings or covering her head, she is asked what she intended. If she says, “I did not intend separation,” she is believed. If she says, “I intended divorce,” her statement about the number intended is accepted. If she says, “I intended three,” it counts as three divorces where she has been given the choice; where authority has been delegated to her, however, he may contest her decision if he claims to have intended a particular number. If she says, “I intended separation but had no particular number of divorces in mind,” then, according to Muhammad ibn al-Mawwāz, where authority has been delegated to her, it counts as one revocable divorce. In al-Tafsīr, Yahyā reports from Ibn al-Qāsim that it counts as three.

If he remains silent, neither objecting to her act nor asking what she intended until they have left the gathering, and she then says, “I intended three by that,” her decision stands unless he contests it, claiming that he intended a particular number when he spoke and swearing to that effect. Asbagh said that he must swear two oaths: one that he did not know her act would make an irrevocable divorce binding upon him and did not consent to it, and another that he intended one divorce.

Ibn al-Mawwāz said that he combines both matters in a single oath. In al-ʿAshara, Yahyā reports from Ibn al-Qāsim that her moving away, together with his remaining silent without asking her during the gathering what she intended by doing so, makes an irrevocable divorce binding upon him in all cases. He may not contest her statement if she says, “I intended three,” nor is she believed if she says, “I intended one.”

If she makes her response conditional, the condition falls into one of four categories. The first is something that may or may not occur. The second is likewise uncertain, but more likely to occur. The third is something known to be inevitable within a period they could both live to see. The fourth is something known not to occur.

As for the first category—for example, her saying, “I have chosen myself if a visit to my co-wife takes place, or if so-and-so arrives,” or the like—there are two positions. The first is Ibn al-Qāsim’s position in al-Mudawwana: the matter reverts to her, and she may either exercise her choice or relinquish it. The second is Sahnūn’s position: this amounts to relinquishing the authority granted to her, and she may no longer exercise it.

As for the second category—for example, her saying, “I have chosen myself when such-and-such a woman menstruates”—she is divorced immediately according to Ibn al-Qāsim’s position. According to Ashhab’s position, the matter reverts to her, and she may either exercise her choice or