the delay is not so long as to make it clear that she has willingly relinquished her right. A prolonged delay here means more than two months, according to Ibn al-Qāsim’s transmissions in the Book of Granting a Choice and Delegating Divorce. An exception is where the husband is present when the delegated authority takes effect and she refuses him intercourse: her authority then remains in her hands, however long the matter continues. This is like a slave woman who is freed while married to a slave: her right to choose does not lapse with the passage of time so long as she refuses him intercourse, since her refusal shows that she continues to assert her right. Yahyā narrated from Ibn Wahb that her right lapses if she does not exercise it when the delegated authority takes effect, before the sitting in which it took effect ends. This is by analogy with authority delegated directly to the wife in person. This is also Ashhab’s opinion in ‘Abd al-Malik ibn al-Hasan’s transmissions in the aforementioned book, and the apparent meaning of the passage in ‘Īsā’s transmissions in the Book of Marriage, in the subsection headed “He testified.”
Section
Delegation of the power of divorce falls into three categories: unqualified delegation, delegation leaving the matter to her discretion, and restricted delegation. Unqualified delegation consists of saying, “Your marital affairs are in your own hands.” It takes two forms. The first is where the husband, or someone he authorizes, addresses her directly with these words. The second is where neither he nor someone he authorizes addresses her directly; rather, he writes her a letter to that effect or sends her a messenger. This has already been discussed.
Delegation leaving the matter to her discretion consists of saying to her, “Your marital affairs are in your own hands, if you wish,” or “when you wish,” or “whenever you wish” [or “at whatever time you wish.” These are four expressions that leave the matter to her discretion, and their rulings differ according to their meanings. As for “whenever you wish” or “at whatever time you wish”], there is no disagreement that the authority remains in her hands until she is required to decide. The only disagreement concerns whether intercourse terminates that authority, on which there are two opinions: according to Ibn al-Qāsim, it does; according to Asbagh, it does not.
As for “if you wish” and “when you wish,” there are three opinions. The first is Mālik’s view that these are exactly like unqualified delegation. The second is Ibn al-Qāsim’s view that the authority remains in her hands until she is required to decide, unlike his position on unqualified delegation. The third is Asbagh’s view that if the husband says “if you wish,” the authority remains in her hands only during that sitting, whereas if he says “when you wish,” it remains in her hands until she is required to decide. According to him, intercourse does not terminate her authority in the case of “when,” unlike “if.” Ibn al-Qāsim gave differing opinions concerning a husband’s statement, “You are divorced if