because of some circumstance that prompts the woman to seek release from her husband. The creditors did not extend credit on that understanding. This is comparable to a woman who commits an injury punishable by legal retaliation and then pays money to secure her release from it while she is in debt. In the chapter on settlements in al-Mudawwana, it states that a person whose debts exhaust his assets may not, after committing an injury punishable by retaliation, reach a settlement that releases him from retaliation at his creditors’ expense. It has also been said that this means he may not do so in the first instance, but that if he does, the settlement takes effect and is binding.
According to this interpretation, a divorce in return for compensation obtained by a woman in debt would take effect and be binding. This, however, is a strained interpretation. The correct position is that it is not valid unless the creditors approve it. Those who adopted this interpretation did so only because the apparent meaning of this passage conflicts with what appears in the chapter on pledges: that a pledgee has priority over other creditors with respect to collateral taken to secure compensation for intentional or accidental injury. What that passage means, however, is intentional injury for which there is no retaliation, and accidental injury whose compensation is not borne by the offender’s kin. Understood in this way, the rulings are sound and free of contradiction, with no need for that strained interpretation.
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The distinction between intentional injury punishable by retaliation and intentional injury not punishable by retaliation is that the latter gives rise to a debt imposed upon the offender by law, rather than a financial obligation he voluntarily undertook. The injured person may therefore assert his claim alongside the other creditors, as with other debts. Intentional injury punishable by retaliation, however, does not give rise to a monetary claim; the injured person is entitled only to retaliation. If the offender offers him money in exchange for foregoing it, he has used up his creditors’ assets to save himself from retaliation. He may not do this without their permission.
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There is likewise disagreement concerning divorce in return for compensation obtained by a sick woman or a heavily pregnant woman. One opinion holds that it is valid and binding upon her heirs if she pays compensation customary for a woman in her circumstances. Ibn Wahb narrated this from Mālik. According to this narration, divorce in return for compensation takes precedence over the heirs’ rights. Another opinion holds that it is invalid, without qualification. This is the apparent meaning of Mālik’s statement in al-Mudawwana and in the book of Ibn al-Mawwāz. A third opinion holds that it is invalid if she pays more than her husband would inherit from her, but valid if she pays an amount equal to or less than his inheritance from her. This is the opinion of Ibn al-Qāsim. There is also disagreement over when this is to be assessed: whether on the day of the divorce or on the day of