the appointed term, but then changes her mind and brings her case before the ruler, the term starts afresh. Ibn Habīb relates in al-Wādiha that if she observes her waiting period after a term has been fixed, but does not marry before her husband reaches an age at which he could no longer be alive and is declared dead, she inherits from him. This is an implausible view.
Section
If the missing man’s circumstances become known through his return, or through learning that he is alive or dead, before the appointed term and the waiting period have elapsed, that judgment is overturned by agreement. She must then act according to what becomes known of his circumstances: if his death is established, she observes her waiting period from the day of his death; if he is known to be alive, she remains bound to him in marriage. Likewise, if, after the appointed term and the waiting period have elapsed, it becomes known that he died before then, that judgment is overturned, and she observes her waiting period from the day of his death. If she married during that waiting period, her new husband has married a woman still in her waiting period. If, however, it becomes known that he died after the appointed term and the waiting period had elapsed, or that he is alive, there are three opinions:
The first is that the judgment remains in force and is not overturned: he has no claim to her, and she does not inherit from him. Ibn 'Ayshūn relates this opinion from Ibn Nāfi' in his abridgment. It is an implausible view, for when a judge rules on the basis of independent legal reasoning, and it subsequently becomes apparent to him or to someone else that his ruling contains an error acknowledged by all, that judgment must be overturned by consensus. If, by analogy with this, it were held that the missing husband always has the prior claim to his wife, even if she has remarried and the new husband has consummated the marriage—just as in the case of a husband whose death had been reported to his wife—this would have some basis in analogy. Yet they have not held this view. How far removed this is from Ibn Nāfi's opinion! His opinion does, however, resemble what is related from Mālik concerning a man whose date palms an assessor estimated would yield four wasqs, but who harvested five: the assessed amount, rather than the actual yield, is to be followed. The correct view is that zakāh is due from him, because the assessor’s error has become apparent, making it necessary to revert to what is correct.
The second opinion is that the judgment is overturned so long as she has not remarried. He then has the prior claim to her if he is found to be alive; if he is found to have died, she is entitled to her share of his estate and observes her waiting period from the day of his death.
The third opinion is that the judgment is overturned even if she has remarried, provided the new husband has not consummated the marriage. She is then restored to her first husband if he is alive, and the second marriage is annulled. If he is dead, she is entitled to her share of his estate. The second marriage is then examined: if it took place after his death and the completion of her waiting period following his death, it remains valid and is not annulled; but if