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There are two views on whether a man may have intercourse with his wife when he has been compelled and legally required to take her back, without intending to do so or having any intention of resuming the marriage. The first—and correct—view is that he may, because the judicial ruling restores her to his marital bond, whether he wishes it or not. Intercourse is therefore permissible, just as it is for someone compelled to marry by a person with authority to compel him—a father, testamentary guardian, or master—even though the marriage was imposed upon him without his consent. Abū ʿImrān al-Fāsī adopted this view, citing as evidence the case of someone who contracts a marriage in jest: when the marriage is judicially enforced, intercourse is permissible for him. Some of the Baghdad scholars said that he may not enjoy marital intimacy with her unless, when compelled to take her back, he intends to do so. The correct view, however, is the one stated above.

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This concerns a wife with whom the marriage has been consummated. As for one with whom it has not been consummated, divorcing her is permissible even if she is menstruating or experiencing postnatal bleeding. Ashhab considered this disliked, but there is no basis for his position. The reason for prohibiting divorce during menstruation is that it prolongs the woman’s waiting period, since the menstrual period during which she is divorced does not count among the cycles of her waiting period. Allah Most High says:

“Divorce them for the commencement of their waiting period.” [al-Talāq: 1]

A woman with whom the marriage has not been consummated has no waiting period, so he may divorce her whenever he wishes.

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There is disagreement over whether a husband may divorce his pregnant wife during menstruation if she menstruates while pregnant. It is reported from Abū ʿImrān al-Fāsī that divorcing her during such menstruation is permissible. Divorce during menstruation was only deemed disliked because that menstrual period does not count towards her waiting period, thereby prolonging it. This woman’s waiting period, however, ends when she gives birth, so the reason for the prohibition no longer applies.

In his book ʿUyūn al-adilla, Ibn al-Qassār was confronted with an opponent’s objection: “If a pregnant woman could menstruate, divorce during that menstruation would be forbidden.” He replied: “That is indeed what we say: divorce during it is forbidden.” The reasoning behind this view is that the divorce takes place in a state in which pronouncing it is prohibited. It is therefore impermissible even when the underlying reason—harming her by prolonging her waiting period—is absent. Its analogical basis is the case in which the woman gives him permission to do so.