The second is that his statement is not accepted, because he may be suspected of seeking to enrich his children. This is the view of Ibn Abī Hāzim.

The rationale for the first report is that this concerns establishing a claim arising from a killing, so it must be established by the same means as a claim arising from intentional killing.

The rationale for the second report is that accidental killing entails a financial liability borne by the ‘āqila (those collectively liable for blood money). His statement thus resembles someone saying at the approach of death, “So-and-so owes me such-and-such.” This view is better supported by analogy, although the first report is more widely known. Allah knows best.

Section

If a man sustains a wound for which a prescribed amount of compensation is due, whether inflicted intentionally or accidentally, and then dies from that wound, there are three possible cases:

The first is that the wound is known only through the statement of the deceased, so-and-so: “So-and-so bears responsibility for my blood. He inflicted this wound you see on me, and it is from this that I am dying.” The correct position here is that there is no right to exact retaliation for the wound or to collect compensation for it if it was accidental. This is because qasāma oaths do not establish a right to retaliation for intentional wounds or to compensation for accidental ones. Rather, the victim’s next of kin may swear the oaths and have the killer put to death if the wound was intentional, or his heirs may swear the oaths and establish their entitlement to blood money from the ‘āqila if it was