the disagreement concerning his statement, “I killed so-and-so accidentally,” is well known and established; how much more so when the statement itself has not been established. Divergent rulings on this also occur in the Book of Settlements in al-Mudawwana. In one passage, his admission to the killing is treated as lawth warranting blood money payable by the paternal kin responsible for blood money, following qasāma, whether the victim died on the spot or survived for a time. This means that he must not be suspected of seeking to enrich his child, as stated in the Book of Blood Money. Elsewhere, he says that the blood money is payable from the killer’s own property following qasāma; elsewhere again, without qasāma. He makes no distinction between whether the victim survived for a time or not.

In my view, disagreement over whether qasāma is required can arise only when the victim survived for a time. If, however, he died outright without surviving the injury, the blood money is payable from the killer’s own property without qasāma. This is how the transmitted reports should be understood. For when the blood money is made payable from his own property, on the grounds that the paternal kin do not bear liability arising from a confession, his admission affects only himself. The disagreement concerns only whether qasāma is required alongside his admission when the victim survived for a time, just as there is disagreement concerning a killer’s confession to intentional killing when the victim survived for a time. Allah knows best.

Section

Regarding a dying person’s statement, “So-and-so is responsible for my blood,” Mālik consistently held that, in cases of intentional killing, it constitutes lawth warranting qasāma and retaliatory execution, whether the dying person was upright or of discredited character. All his followers and al-Layth ibn Sa‘d agreed with him. The majority of scholars disagreed, citing in support of their position the Messenger of Allah’s words, may Allah bless him and grant him peace:

“Were people to be granted their claims…”—and the remainder of the hadith.

They argued that property enjoys a lesser degree of inviolability than human life: if a person’s statement against another is not accepted in a claim concerning property, then it is all the more deserving of rejection in a claim concerning bloodshed. None of these objections, however, is compelling. The hadith they cite provides no proof for their position, because the person bringing and pursuing the blood claim is the victim’s heir. We have not granted him his claim merely on his own assertion, but on the strength of the victim’s statement added to it.

Nor is their argument sound that, if his statement is not accepted concerning property, it should all the more readily be rejected concerning life. The very purpose for which qasāma was instituted is to safeguard lives. What is sought in it is grounds for suspicion and incriminating indications sufficient to warrant retaliation, through which lives are preserved. Allah, Mighty and Majestic, says:

“In retaliation there is life for you.” [al-Baqara: 179]

The proof that Mālik’s position is correct is the saying of Allah, Mighty and Majestic: