by reference to an illness, a journey, or some similar circumstance that may or may not occur—for example, by saying, “You are pledged to manumission upon my death if I die from this illness, on this journey, or in this town,” or, “You are pledged to manumission upon my death if so-and-so arrives,” and the like. There is disagreement concerning this. In the chapter on slaves pledged to manumission upon their masters’ death in al-‘Utbiyya, Asbagh relates from Ibn al-Qāsim that this is a bequest, not a pledge of manumission upon death, unless the master is deemed to have meant and intended such a pledge. According to this report, he may therefore revoke it during that illness and sell the slave if he wishes. In Muhammad ibn al-Mawwāz’s book, however, Ibn al-Qāsim holds—and in Muhammad ibn Sahnūn’s book, both Ibn al-Qāsim and Ibn Kināna hold—that it is a binding pledge of manumission upon death which cannot be revoked. As I understand it, this applies if he dies from that illness.

This disagreement may be inferred from the disagreement recorded in al-Mudawwana between Ibn al-Qāsim and Mālik concerning a man who says to his slave, “You are free when so-and-so arrives.” Mālik said, “He may not sell him until it becomes clear whether so-and-so will arrive.” Ibn al-Qāsim said, “I see no harm in selling him.” Likewise, if he says to his slave, “You are pledged to manumission upon my death if so-and-so arrives,” then, according to Mālik, the pledge becomes binding immediately, subject to so-and-so’s arrival. He may neither sell the slave nor revoke the pledge verbally until there is no longer any hope of so-and-so’s arrival. According to Ibn al-Qāsim, however, this is not a pledge of manumission upon death, but merely a bequest. His words thus amount to saying, “When so-and-so arrives—or if he arrives—let my slave so-and-so be freed on my behalf after my death.” He may therefore sell the slave or revoke the bequest verbally if he wishes, saying either before or after so-and-so’s arrival, “I have revoked my bequest to free so-and-so.” This differs from saying, “You are free when so-and-so arrives.” According to Ibn al-Qāsim’s position, he may not revoke this verbally; he may only sell the slave, because the declaration resembles an oath. If the slave remains in his ownership until so-and-so arrives, the manumission becomes binding upon him.

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The following clarifies our view that the disagreement concerning a pledge of manumission upon death qualified by an event that may or may not occur can be inferred from al-Mudawwana: if a man were to qualify such a pledge concerning his slave by a future event certain to occur—for example, by saying to him, “When so-and-so dies, you are pledged to manumission upon my death,” or, “When the year ends, you are pledged to manumission upon my death”—the pledge would, by agreement, become binding upon him, and he would have no right to revoke it. This is just as manumission deferred to a future time certain to come is binding upon him by agreement. Success comes through Allah Most High.