until after his death. Another opinion is that, if he frees his share in a jointly owned slave, a ruling charging him with his co-owner’s share at its assessed value is issued during his illness, but that share is not emancipated until he dies. If he dies, his co-owner’s share that was charged to him at its assessed value—or as much of it as the third can cover—is emancipated against one-third of his estate. His co-owner retains his interest during the illness unless he consents otherwise, since it is not known whether the third will cover it. He therefore has grounds for refusing to have his share assessed, with the remainder remaining enslaved to his heirs. This is Asbagh’s opinion. Sound reasoning requires that the assessment of a share should not be expedited unless it will lead to certain emancipation. Another opinion is that its value is ascertained during the illness, but it is not charged to him until he dies. If he dies, that value is charged against one-third of his estate. If the third cannot cover it, emancipation takes effect to the extent that the third can cover, while the portion it cannot cover remains enslaved to the co-owner who did not emancipate his share.

The second is the opinion of some transmitters in al-Mudawwana: neither is the remainder of his own slave emancipated against one-third of his estate, nor is his co-owner’s share charged to him at its assessed value against that third.

The third is Ibn al-Mājishūn’s opinion in al-Wādiha: his co-owner’s share is charged to him at its assessed value against one-third of his estate, subject to the disagreement already mentioned over whether this assessment is expedited or deferred; however, the remainder of his own slave is not emancipated against that third. So far as I know, they agree that, if the matter does not come to light until after his death, neither is the remainder of his own slave emancipated after his death, nor is his co-owner’s share charged to him at its assessed value, whether against his estate as a whole or against one-third of it. This applies when a long time has elapsed. If only a short time has elapsed, there are three opinions:

The first is that, after his death, neither is the remainder of his own slave emancipated, nor is his co-owner’s share charged to him at its assessed value, whether against his estate as a whole or against one-third of it. This is the apparent meaning of the passage in al-Mudawwana.

The second is that his co-owner’s share is charged to him at its assessed value after his death if he dies shortly after emancipating his own share, because this is a right that has already become due to his co-owner. However, if he owned the entire slave, the remainder is not emancipated. This is Mālik’s opinion as reported from him by Ashhab in al-‘Utbiyya, and by Mutarrif and Ibn al-Mājishūn in al-Wādiha.

The third is that, if death overtakes him unexpectedly, the remainder of his own slave is emancipated after his death if he owned the entire slave, and his co-owner’s share is charged to him at its assessed value. Ibn Habīb related this opinion from Mālik and his companions