with a wife after pronouncing zihār—the declaration that she is as unlawful to him as his mother. Manumission is not obligatory as expiation for a broken oath, since one may choose between freeing a slave, feeding the needy, and clothing them; fasting is then required of someone who lacks the means.

An obligation concerning a specified slave falls into two categories:

The first concerns a slave already in his ownership.

The second concerns a slave not in his ownership.

For slaves already in his ownership, manumission becomes obligatory through five things: a vow, an oath, īlāʾ, freeing part of a slave, and mutilation.

A vow is, for example, saying: “I owe it to Allah to free this slave of mine if Allah does such-and-such,” or something similar. According to Ibn al-Qāsim, he is instructed to free the slave but is not compelled to do so. Ashhab said: “If he persists in refusing to free him, the slave is emancipated by judicial authority.” Ibn al-Qāsim’s reasoning is that emancipation without the requisite intention does not fulfil the vow; compelling him to free the slave would therefore deprive him of the opportunity to fulfil it.

As for an oath, he is compelled to free the slave whenever the matter comes to light, since emancipation has become binding upon him through his breach of the oath. If this occurred while he was healthy, the slave’s value is charged against his estate as a whole. If it occurred in al-fard, or if his oath required him to perform an act and he died without performing it, the slave’s value is charged against one-third of his estate.

As for īlāʾ, it entails the slave woman’s emancipation after her owner’s death, with her value charged against his estate as a whole, whether it occurred while he was healthy or ill.

Freeing part of a slave obliges his master, by judicial ruling, to free the remainder, provided that the master has not become insolvent or died. If he becomes insolvent or dies before a judgment requiring emancipation is issued against him, the remainder is not freed. There is disagreement concerning a master who falls ill and whose partial emancipation of the slave comes to light during that illness. One opinion is that the remainder is emancipated during his illness, with its value charged against one-third of his estate. Another is that it is not emancipated from that third until after his death. A third is that, if he has secure assets, the remainder is emancipated during his illness; otherwise, it is not emancipated until he dies. A fourth is that the remainder is not emancipated until he recovers. These are four opinions, all supported by passages in al-Mudawwana.