with someone else, Mālik consistently held that its provisions are to be carried out. Ashhab makes further distinctions in this matter, which are discussed in their proper place.

Section

A spendthrift or a person under guardianship may validly make a will, since restrictions are imposed on his property only for fear that he might fall into poverty, whereas a will takes effect only after death, when poverty is no longer a concern for him. A person suffering from insanity may validly make a will during a lucid interval. According to Mālik and his companions, a minor who understands acts of devotion may also validly make a will, contrary to Abū Hanīfa and to one of al-Shāfiʿī’s two positions.

Section

Those who hold that making a will is obligatory have relied on the apparent meaning of this hadith, arguing that the word “right” implies obligation. This is incorrect, for when something is described as a right incumbent “upon him,” it may indicate either obligation or recommendation. When, however, it is attributed to him and described as his—by saying, “It is right for him to do this, or such-and-such”—the more apparent meaning is recommendation, not obligation.

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Further evidence that the hadith is intended to encourage and recommend, rather than impose an obligation, is that some of its narrators give the wording: “who has property concerning which he wishes to make a will.” Making the will conditional upon the testator’s wishes explicitly establishes that it is not obligatory.

Section

Even if the hadith were understood as imposing an obligation, it would refer to matters already incumbent upon him, such as repaying debts, returning property entrusted to him, paying zakat that he has neglected to pay, and similar specific obligations. Whatever a man is obliged to discharge during his lifetime, he must provide for in his will as death approaches. This is unlike bequeathing some of his property to a charitable cause.