the option he had stipulated, pleading ignorance to explain his silence while the slave remained in the purchaser’s possession after the option period expired, and similar cases.

The second concerns possession: if someone holds another man’s property in his presence for a period sufficient to give that possession legal effect, then claims to have purchased it from him, his claim is accepted upon his oath. The owner is not excused if he pleads ignorance, for his silence invalidates his claim.

The third concerns a woman who has been delegated the power to divorce herself and pronounces three divorces. Her husband remains silent and raises no objection, but later wishes to challenge her decision, pleading ignorance to explain his silence. It also includes a woman who makes no decision and remains silent until intercourse takes place or the sitting ends—according to the differing views on this—then wishes to exercise her authority and pleads ignorance. Similar cases include a slave woman who is emancipated while married to a slave but does not exercise her choice until her husband has intercourse with her; she then wishes to choose separation and pleads ignorance to explain her silence until intercourse occurred.

The fourth concerns a witness who sees sexual relations being treated as lawful, a free person being made to serve as a slave, or similar matters involving rights owed to Allah, yet remains silent and does not come forward with his testimony. He then comes forward after some time, pleading ignorance to explain his silence.

The fifth concerns a divorced woman whose husband takes her back. She remains silent until he has intercourse with her, then claims that her waiting period had already expired, pleading ignorance to explain her silence.

The sixth concerns a woman who is married off in her presence. She remains silent and does not object until her husband consummates the marriage with her. She then challenges the marriage, saying that she did not consent to it and pleading ignorance to explain her silence until consummation.

The seventh concerns a man whose property is sold and taken into the purchaser’s possession while he is present and raises no objection. He then claims that he did not consent to the sale and pleads ignorance.

He may instead have meant seven cases within a single category relating to divorce:

The first is the case of a man making a bequest to his slave under a contract of emancipation—from the transmission of Īsā in the Book of Giving a Wife the Choice of Divorce and Delegating Divorce to Her. It discusses a man who delegates to his wife the power to divorce herself, and she says, “I have accepted.” She then reaches a settlement with him before he asks her what she accepted. Afterwards, she says, “I had intended three divorces,” seeking to recover what she gave in the settlement. The ruling is that she has no claim against