many other cases known to him. He said: “In invalid sales, someone who acts in ignorance and someone who acts deliberately are treated alike, except as regards sin.” He also said: “Likewise, in ablution and prayer, the ignorant and the deliberate are treated alike; and in Hajj, they are treated alike in many of its rulings.”
The jurist Ibn ʿAttāb, may Allah have mercy on him, did well to collect these cases. However, he merely sought to mention every case in which he found someone expressly stating that ignorance was no excuse, even if others disagreed. His collection was not exhaustive, although he gathered many cases. He omitted numerous cases in which ignorance is no excuse, whether by agreement or according to a disputed opinion, because he found no express statement to that effect in them.
These include the case of a man who sees that his wife is pregnant and does not deny responsibility for the pregnancy, but later wishes to disown it; and that of a witness who sees sexual relations being treated as lawful, or a slave being made to serve, yet neither comes forward with his testimony nor objects. Other cases concern someone who consumes an orphan’s property, a usurper, a brigand, someone who sets himself up to issue fatwas without knowledge, a physician who causes death through his treatment despite being ignorant of medicine, and a witness who errs in his testimony in matters involving property or prescribed punishments. He mentioned none of these. Such cases, despite their differing circumstances, are too numerous to enumerate or confine to a fixed number.
As for the judge Ibn Bishr, may Allah have mercy on him, he contributed nothing on this question. The jurist Ibn ʿAttāb, may Allah have mercy on him, collected the cases he mentioned to demonstrate that the jurist Abū ʿUmar al-Ishbīlī, may Allah have mercy on him, had erred in limiting them to seven. In doing so, however, Ibn ʿAttāb’s examination was inadequate and his interpretation mistaken. For the jurist Abū ʿUmar al-Ishbīlī, may Allah have mercy on him, with his vast learning and eminent standing, was not someone who would be ignorant of these cases or unaware of where they were discussed, nor someone who would make such an obvious mistake.
Knowing this, I considered what he might have intended. It seemed possible that he meant a particular category whose cases were limited to seven. I considered that this category might comprise those cases in which merely remaining silent about another person’s action extinguishes the silent party’s right and invalidates his claim, by agreement. For I found seven cases in this category, with no eighth:
The first is this case concerning the right of pre-emption, together with analogous cases. These include a debtor who emancipates a slave in the presence of his creditors, who remain silent and raise no objection, but then wish to challenge his action; and a man who sells a slave while reserving an option to rescind the sale, then leaves him in the purchaser’s possession until a considerable time has passed after the option period expires, and subsequently seeks to reclaim him on the basis of