and pleads ignorance; the case of a thief who steals a garment used to hold dirhams, worth less than three dirhams, with dirhams tied inside it of which he was unaware; and the case of a pledge-holder who has intercourse with a slave woman pledged to him and pleads ignorance.
Ibn ʿAttāb said that many such cases could be found. He also mentioned cases of differing kinds found in al-Mudawwana, al-Mustakhraja and other legal collections, which expressly state that ignorance is no excuse. Some are agreed upon, while others are disputed.
These include the report of Marʿūs concerning a woman who confessed to unlawful intercourse in ignorance; and the case recorded in Ibn al-Qāsim’s transmission concerning a man who gives his wife the choice of divorce. She pronounces one divorce, but is told, “That is not an option open to you.” She then wishes to pronounce three divorces instead, pleading ignorance regarding her earlier decision.
They also include Asbagh’s report from Ibn al-Qāsim concerning someone who requires his father to swear an oath over a claim of his: his testimony is inadmissible, even if he did not know that this constituted mistreatment of a parent. The same applies to someone who clips dinars without knowing that doing so is disapproved.
Al-Dimyātiyya mentions the case of a man who returns pledged property to the pledgor: this releases it from the pledge, and ignorance does not excuse him.
Al-Wādiha discusses someone who sells a slave woman and says that she had a husband who divorced her or died, and the slave woman confirms this. The purchaser may neither have intercourse with her nor marry her off until witnesses establish the truth of the account or the husband’s death. If he wishes to return her, claiming that he thought the statements of the seller and the slave woman were sufficient, he has no right to do so, even if he is someone unfamiliar with this rule.
Another example is Ashhab’s statement in his legal collection concerning a man who emancipates a slave woman who has borne him a child, then has intercourse with her during her waiting period and pleads ignorance: he is subject to the prescribed punishment and is not excused, just as a man would not be excused if he committed unlawful intercourse and claimed not to know that it was forbidden.
Ashhab distinguished the man who emancipates such a woman from a man who divorces his wife three times and then has intercourse with her during her waiting period, or divorces her once before consummation and subsequently has intercourse with her. In these latter two cases, he held that the child’s paternity is attributed to the man and that he is not subject to the prescribed punishment, because there is room for doubt for those unfamiliar with the law.
There is also Ibn Habīb’s report from Asbagh concerning a man who pronounces zihār—a declaration likening his wife to a woman permanently forbidden to him in marriage—and then has intercourse before making expiation: he is subject to disciplinary punishment, and ignorance does not excuse him. Likewise, an executor who purchases a Christian slave woman and emancipates her is liable for the loss, even if he acted mistakenly; neither ignorance nor error excuses him. He also cited Ibn Abī Habība’s report in al-Muwatta concerning the young cucumber and al-fanā.
Another case concerns someone who accuses a slave of unlawful intercourse, when it subsequently emerges that the slave was already free, having been emancipated beforehand without the accuser’s knowledge. The accuser is liable to the prescribed punishment for that accusation. Likewise, if the emancipated person drinks wine, accuses someone of unlawful intercourse, or commits unlawful intercourse without knowing of his emancipation, he is liable to the prescribed punishment for the offence he has committed.
There is also the case of someone who purchases a person who becomes free upon coming into his ownership, without knowing that this emancipation takes effect. He also mentioned