In my view, the ruling in this case is sound and admits of no objection. The words “provided he is someone whose like would be employed in a profit-sharing partnership” do not complete the preceding statement so as to mean: “If he refuses to swear, the working partner’s word is accepted upon his oath, provided he is someone whose like would be employed in a profit-sharing partnership.” Rather, the statement ends with “If he refuses to swear, the working partner’s word is accepted upon his oath.” A new statement then begins, meaning: “The procedure concerning oaths that I have described applies only if he is someone whose like would be employed in a profit-sharing partnership.” For in that case, each party has made a plausible claim against the other, and each is therefore entitled to require the other to swear an oath, as we have explained. If both refuse to swear, or both swear, the working partner receives the customary remuneration for such work, unless it exceeds half the profit, as stated. If the working partner refuses to swear and the provider swears, the provider takes the capital and its profit and owes no remuneration. If the provider refuses to swear and the working partner swears, the working partner becomes entitled to half the profit, in accordance with his sworn claim.

If, however, the working partner is not someone whose like would be employed in a profit-sharing partnership, he is not permitted to swear an oath, because his claim is implausible. The provider’s word is then accepted. If he swears, his claim that he entrusted the funds to the recipient to trade on his behalf is upheld, and he owes no remuneration. If he refuses to swear, the working partner’s word is accepted, even though he is not someone whose like would be employed in a profit-sharing partnership. By refusing to swear, the provider has enabled him to establish his claim, even though it is implausible. This, and nothing else, is the meaning of the ruling in this case.

If the recipient of the funds were known to work for others in profit-sharing partnerships, then, according to Ibn al-Qāsim’s position, his word would have to be accepted that he received the funds under the profit-sharing arrangement he claims, provided the share he claims is plausible as the customary profit share for someone like him. If it is not, both parties swear an oath, and he receives the customary profit share for someone like him. This follows by analogy with Ibn al-Qāsim’s ruling in the Book of Rewards and Hiring concerning a dispute between a craftsman and the owner of a garment: the owner says, “You did the work for me free of charge,” while the craftsman says, “Rather, I did it for you for such-and-such an amount.”

By analogy with another authority’s position on the craftsman’s case in that same book, the recipient’s word is accepted that he received the funds under the profit-sharing arrangement he claims. If the share he claims exceeds the customary profit share for someone like him, both parties swear an oath, and he receives the customary profit share. We should note the distinction between these three cases: