he may receive the commodity when it is worth a thousand dinars and return it when it is worth a hundred, thereby taking some of the capital for himself. Conversely, he may receive it when it is worth a hundred dinars and return it when it is worth a thousand, thereby allowing the capital provider to take the working partner’s remuneration.
If the capital is the price for which the working partner sells it, the capital provider has stipulated a benefit for himself: the working partner bears the burden of selling it on his behalf and spares him that trouble. If the capital is its value on the day he hands it over, the capital provider has effectively sold the merchandise to the working partner at their agreed valuation, on condition that, if he sells it for less, he makes up the shortfall from his profit, while, if he sells it for more, the capital provider receives half the surplus. That gain involves manifest uncertainty and muzābana. It is like handing someone a garment to sell for ten dinars on condition that he bears any shortfall and receives part of any surplus.
If the capital is its value on the day of tafādul, this too involves manifest uncertainty, since its value on that day is unknown. The working partner would therefore be working with an unknown amount of capital: it might be so high that it absorbs all his profit, or so low that he takes some of the capital provider’s capital. Thus, every form of this arrangement entails uncertainty and invalidity.
Nevertheless, according to Ibn al-Qāsim’s position, the ruling differs once such an arrangement has actually been entered into. If the parties designate the sale proceeds as the capital, the working partner receives the customary remuneration for selling the merchandise. He is then awarded the customary partnership share on the proceeds, provided that the invalidity is discovered only after work has begun. In all the other cases, he is treated as a hired worker entitled to the customary remuneration.
In his Muwatta’, Ibn Wahb cited the position of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Abī Salama recorded in al-Mudawwana: if someone establishes an investment partnership with merchandise at an agreed valuation, the working partner is treated as a hired worker. Ibn Wahb then said, “Mālik rejected this.” According to Ibn Wahb’s understanding of Mālik’s position, whatever form the investment partnership takes, the working partner receives the customary remuneration for selling the merchandise and is then awarded the customary partnership share thereafter. This applies when he sells the merchandise for money. If he sells it for other merchandise, however, there can be no disagreement: he is entitled to the customary remuneration, according to the sole position on the matter. The first position—that he receives the customary remuneration whether he sells for money or for merchandise—is clearer.
If, in an investment partnership established with merchandise, the parties do not specify what constitutes the capital, and the person supplying the merchandise says no more than, “Take this merchandise and trade with it as an investment partnership,” this is equivalent to saying, “Sell it and trade with the proceeds as an investment partnership.” This was stated by Ibn al-Mawwāz.
It has been both permitted and disapproved. Ashhab reported that Mālik permitted it, while Ibn al-Qāsim reported that he disapproved of it. If the arrangement has been entered into, it is not annulled, whether work has begun or not, as Ibn al-Qāsim stated—unless the capital provider had said, “Exchange it or have it minted, and trade with it,”