but this is not a sound analogy, for if recovery is sought from the purchaser, he may reclaim the price from the usurper, whereas if recovery is sought from the donee, he has no recourse against anyone. It has been reported from Asbagh that, if a usurper gives the property away and the donee derives income from it, the donee need not return that income. This is implausible unless his statement is understood to mean only that no claim is made against the donee when the usurper is solvent, or unless he follows the view that the usurper is entitled to the yield because he bears liability, in which case the donee takes his place.
Section
There are three opinions concerning the point at which property claimed by a rightful claimant comes under his liability, its yield becomes his, and its sequestration becomes obligatory:
The first is that he neither bears liability for it nor becomes entitled to its yield until judgment is given in his favour. This accords with Mālik’s statement in al-Mudawwanah that the yield belongs to the person in possession until judgment is given in favour of the claimant. According to this opinion, neither must the disputed property be sequestered in a manner that removes it from its possessor’s control, nor must its yield be impounded. This is Ibn al-Qāsim’s opinion in al-Mudawwanah: immovable properties, which cannot be moved or removed, are not to be impounded in the same way as movable property; rather, they are placed under an order prohibiting alterations to them.
The second is that the claimant bears liability for the property, becomes entitled to its yield, and must have it sequestered so as to remove it from its possessor’s control once his right to it is established by the testimony of two men, or one man and two women. This is the apparent meaning of Mālik’s statement in his Muwattaʾ that the yield belongs to the purchaser until the day the claimant’s right is established. It is also the apparent meaning of the opinion attributed to someone other than Ibn al-Qāsim in al-Mudawwanah, where he states that sequestration becomes obligatory once the claimant has established his right and the defendant has been required to present a defence.