the hand rests liability for what it has taken until it returns it.” Scholars therefore differed over liability for borrowed property because the apparent meanings of these reports conflict.

Some held that the borrower is liable, whether or not evidence establishes its loss, and whether or not the property can be concealed. They relied on the apparent meaning of the Messenger of Allah’s statement, peace and blessings be upon him: “Rather, a loan for which I am liable and which is to be returned.” This is Ashhab’s position, one of Mālik’s two positions, and the position of al-Shāfi‘ī. Others held that the borrower bears no liability under any circumstances, relying on the apparent meaning of the Messenger of Allah’s statement, peace and blessings be upon him: “The borrower bears no liability.” This is Abū Hanīfah’s position.

Others held that the borrower bears no liability unless liability is stipulated as a condition. Ibn Sha‘bān reported this position and criticized it. Still others held that the borrower is liable for property that can be concealed if no evidence establishes its loss. He is not liable for property that cannot be concealed, nor for property whose loss without negligence is established by evidence. This is Mālik’s well-known position, and the position of Ibn al-Qāsim and most of Mālik’s followers. It is the soundest position and the closest to being correct, because it gives effect to all the reports and withstands reasoned examination.

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All the reports can be given effect by interpreting those that establish liability for borrowed property as referring to property that can be concealed when its loss is not established, and those that waive liability as referring to property that cannot be concealed, as well as concealable property whose loss is established.

Moreover, his statement, peace and blessings be upon him, “Rather, a loan for which I am liable and which is to be returned,” is wording that is not self-contained. It therefore cannot validly be cited as evidence that liability is obligatory. Wording that is not self-contained must be confined to the particular occasion that prompted it, rather than applied generally. Scholars of legal theory do not disagree on this point. They differ only over self-contained wording of general import that is uttered on a particular occasion: should its application be confined to that occasion, or should it be applied generally? There are two positions, the sounder of which, according to scholars versed in reasoned inquiry, is to apply it generally;