the gift; the donor is bound to accept its value, and the gift may revert to him only by their mutual consent. The reasoning behind this report is that, by handing over the gift when he was entitled to withhold it until he received recompense, the donor has agreed to accept its value. Likewise, by taking possession when he could have declined both acceptance and possession, the recipient has agreed to pay its value. The view that the recipient becomes liable for its value upon acceptance would also have a sound basis, by analogy with a sale, since a gift made in expectation of recompense is a form of sale. The correct position according to Ibn al-Qāsim’s doctrine is that transmitted through ‘Īsā and Asbagh: the recipient owes its value as assessed on the day the gift was made. For Ibn al-Qāsim holds that liability for an item sold passes to the buyer upon conclusion of the contract, and that the buyer bears its loss if its destruction is established by evidence.

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For a gift made in expectation of recompense, the recipient may give whatever goods he wishes in return, except goods that people do not customarily exchange as recompense, such as firewood, straw, and the like. According to Ibn al-Qāsim, this applies whether before or after the gift becomes unavailable for return, since he makes no distinction between these circumstances in al-Mudawwanah. Had he considered them different, he would have explained this—and Allah knows best. Sahnūn said that the recipient may give whatever goods he wishes in recompense, provided they cover the gift’s value. Ashhab said that he may give only dinars and dirhams, unless both parties agree to something else. If they do agree to something else, his doctrine would require that this be permissible only after both parties have ascertained the gift’s value.

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If the gift has been completed and the recipient wishes to return it but the donor refuses, the ruling follows Ibn al-Qāsim’s differing positions on whether an increase in the gift constitutes a bar to its return. Under the view that such an increase bars its return, the recipient has no right to insist on returning it, even though Ibn al-Qāsim holds that he may give goods in recompense after the gift has become unavailable for return. The distinction between the two questions is that the donor handed over the gift to receive something else when he consents to that recompense or when the gift becomes unavailable for return—not to receive the gift itself back. Under the view that an increase does not bar its return, however, the recipient does have that right. This is Ashhab’s position and one of the two reports transmitted by ‘Īsā from Ibn al-Qāsim.