being transferred out of his ownership? There is a difference of opinion on this, and it resembles his saying, “This is an endowment.”

However, if he says, “This slave is free, and this woman is divorced,” it constitutes the relinquishment of a right, comparable to saying, “So-and-so is absolved of liability for such-and-such, for the blood of so-and-so, or for my accusation against him.” Relinquishing a claim concerning blood, property, or honor belongs to the same category as relinquishing the proprietary right arising from marital authority or the ownership of a slave.

Thus, if he says, “If I do such-and-such, divorce is incumbent upon me,” “emancipation is incumbent upon me,” “then my wife is divorced,” or “then my slaves are free,” and we hold that what this entails is one of two alternatives, he has a choice between its taking effect and the obligation to make expiation—just as if he were to say, “Then this property is charity,” or, “Then this camel is a sacrificial offering.”

An analogous case is when he says, “When the sun rises, my slaves are free or my wives are divorced”—assuming that the choice is his. When he chooses either one, this is equivalent to his choosing between the two alternatives of its taking effect or the obligation to make expiation. [Another example of this] is when a man accepts Islam while married to more than four women, or to two sisters, and then makes the requisite selection among them. In these cases, separation is one of two necessary alternatives—either separation from a particular person or a particular form of separation. No fresh pronouncement of divorce is required; however, divorce becomes fixed only through something that necessitates its specification, as in the analogous cases already mentioned.

Then, if he chooses divorce, does it take effect from the time of his choice or from the time he breaks his oath? This is to be determined by analogy with the corresponding case.

Thus, if, in cases involving vows made in obstinacy and anger, he were to say, “I choose to make expiation,” or, “I choose to perform the vowed act,” does his choice become fixed merely by that statement, or does it become fixed only through performance?