at that point—as if he had said, “By Allah, I shall divorce her this very hour,” but then did not divorce her—or whether it becomes due only when he resolves to retain her; or only when some statement or action on his part indicates that he is content to retain her, as in the case of one given the choice between separating from a woman and retaining her because of a defect or the like, or of a woman emancipated while married to a slave; or whether it does not become due under any circumstances until the opportunity for divorce has passed. It has been said that the ruling in this regard is the same as if he were to say, “Then one-third of my wealth shall be given in charity or as a sacrificial offering,” or the like.

The view most consistent with legal analogy is that his choice between the two remains open, so long as nothing proceeds from him indicating his acceptance of either one, as with all other forms of choice.

[Section: What Is Required by a Vow Made in Obstinacy and Anger]

Section

According to the well-known view in our school, one of two things is required by a vow made in obstinacy and anger: either expiation or performance of the act made conditional. There is no doubt that the import of the wording in a statement such as, “If I do such-and-such, I am obligated to perform two units of prayer, give one thousand in charity, perform Hajj, or fast for a month,” is that the obligation takes effect upon performance of the stipulated act. He therefore has a choice between this obligation and the obligation to make expiation. If he does not [undertake] the conditional obligation, the obligation to make expiation becomes established. Thus, one of the two obligations is binding upon him, each becoming established on the supposition that the other is not discharged, as in an alternative obligation.

The same applies if he says, “If I do such-and-such, I am obligated to emancipate this slave or divorce this woman,” or, “I am obligated to give something in charity or offer a sacrificial animal.” This makes the slave entitled to emancipation, the property due to be given in charity, and the camel due to be offered as a sacrifice.

If instead he made this take immediate effect by saying, “This property is charity, this camel is a sacrificial offering, and I am obligated to emancipate this slave,” does it thereby pass out of his ownership, or does it become subject to