unbelief, by consensus; rather, he is liable either for expiation of an oath or for nothing at all. If, without attaching it to any condition, he were to say, “He is a Jew, a Christian, or an unbeliever,” he would thereby fall into unbelief, just as if he were to say outright, “My slave is free, my wife is divorced, this camel is a sacrificial offering, and I am obligated to fast on Thursday.” If he made unbelief conditional upon something whose occurrence he intended, saying, “When the new moon appears, I am disassociated from the religion of Islam,” he would have to be ruled an unbeliever. Yet his unbelief would not [be delayed], because his assigning it a future time demonstrates the corruption of his belief.
If it is said, concerning an oath made by a vow, that only expiation is incumbent upon him, the same may be said of an oath made by emancipation and, likewise, of an oath made by divorce—as if he were to say, “Then I am obligated to divorce my wife.”
Whoever maintains that nothing is incumbent upon a person who says, “Then I am obligated to divorce my wife,” must, by the same reasoning, maintain that nothing is incumbent upon him in the case of divorce. This is why Tāwūs withheld judgment as to whether it constitutes an oath.
If it is said that he may choose between fulfilling it and making expiation, then here, too, he may choose between effecting the divorce or emancipation and making expiation. If he has intercourse with his wife, this constitutes his choice to make expiation. Similarly, in the case of zihār, he may choose between making expiation and divorcing her; if he has intercourse with her, expiation becomes incumbent upon him. In the case of zihār, however, he may not have intercourse with her until he has made expiation, because zihār is an objectionable and false utterance that has rendered her forbidden to him. Here, by contrast, his statement, “If I do it, she is divorced,” is equivalent to saying, “Then I am obligated to divorce her,” or, “By Allah, I shall certainly divorce her.” If he divorces her, nothing is incumbent upon him; but if he does not, he must offer expiation for an oath.
It remains to ask whether expiation becomes due immediately if he does not divorce her