and the camel’s becoming a sacrificial offering—not the obligation to carry out any of them—just as what is made contingent in his words, “then my slave is free and my wife is divorced,” is the actual occurrence of divorce and emancipation, not their becoming obligatory. This is why the jurists, including our school’s jurists and others, disagreed concerning a person who says, “This is a sacrificial offering, and this is charity for Allah”: does it leave his ownership or not? According to those who hold that it does, this is analogous to his wife and slave leaving his marital and proprietary authority, respectively. At most, it may be said that charitable donations and sacrificial offerings pass into the ownership of other people, unlike a wife and a slave; but this distinction has no legal effect.

Likewise, if he says, “Divorce is incumbent upon me: I shall certainly do such-and-such,” or, “Divorce is binding upon me: I shall certainly do such-and-such,” it is equivalent to his saying, “Hajj is incumbent upon me: I shall certainly do such-and-such.” Here, he has made the obligation to divorce, rather than its actual occurrence, the thing by which he swears—as though he had said, “If I do such-and-such, I must pronounce a divorce.”

Thus, in some forms of swearing by divorce, the object of the oath is expressed in a formula of obligation, just as in some forms of swearing by a vow, the object of the oath is expressed in a formula of actual occurrence.

As for the second response, we say: Grant that what is made contingent upon the act here is the actual occurrence of divorce and emancipation, whereas what is made contingent there is the obligation of charity, Hajj, fasting, and presenting a sacrificial offering. Is not the necessary consequence of the condition that this obligation and that actual occurrence take effect when the condition is fulfilled?

If, when the condition is fulfilled, that obligation does not arise and expiation for an oath instead suffices him, then likewise, when the condition is fulfilled, this occurrence does not take effect; rather, expiation for an oath suffices him. This is just as if he said, “He is a Jew, a Christian, or an unbeliever if he does such-and-such.” What is made contingent here is the occurrence of unbelief when the condition is fulfilled; yet when the condition is fulfilled, there does not occur