Our companions have a well-known disagreement on this question. Al-Athram, al-Khiraqī, and others regard it as his position, whereas al-Khallāl, his disciple, and others do not.

The correct analysis is that it is an analogical extension of his position [and a necessary implication of his position]. It is therefore neither on the same level as a position expressly stated by him nor on the same level as something that does not necessarily follow from his position. Rather, it occupies an intermediate rank. This applies where it is possible that he would not accept that implication.

Furthermore, Allah legislated divorce, whether by permitting it or commanding it, [or by making it binding upon the person] once he effects it. The same applies to manumission and to vows.

These legal acts—vows, divorce, and manumission—make certain things obligatory or prohibited for a person. Obligation and prohibition, however, bind a person only if he intends the legal effect itself or intends its cause. If these words merely passed his lips unintentionally, nothing would bind him by consensus. Likewise, if he uttered these words under duress, their legal effect would not bind him according to us and the majority, as indicated by the Sunnah and the reports of the Companions. This is because his sole intention was to ward off the threatened harm; he intended neither their legal effect nor to utter them of his own accord.

Likewise, when a person swearing an oath says, “If I do not do such-and-such, then Hajj or divorce is binding upon me,” he does not intend to commit himself to Hajj or divorce, nor does he intend, of his own accord, to utter words that would make either binding. His intention is only to spur himself to perform the act or to restrain himself from it, just as the intention of one under duress is to ward off the threatened harm. Then, as an emphatic means of urging or restraint, he says, “If I do such-and-such, this is binding upon me,” or, “This is forbidden to me.” Because he is so intent on avoiding that obligation or prohibition, he makes it contingent upon the act. His purpose is to prevent both the act and its consequence, not to bring about either obligation or prohibition, nor the cause that would give rise to it. Since he intends neither the legal effect nor its cause, but rather intends that the legal effect not arise, that effect should not bind him.