for any further act of manumission. According to the majority, he had no right to revoke this arrangement for posthumous manumission, except according to one opinion of al-Shāfiʿī and one report from Ahmad. As for selling the slave, there is the well-known disagreement. If, however, he made a bequest that the slave be manumitted, saying, “When I die, manumit him,” he could revoke it just like any other bequest, [and he could sell him in this case, even if selling a slave designated for posthumous manumission were impermissible].

Abū ʿAbd Allah Ibrāhīm ibn Muhammad [ibn Muhammad] ibn ʿArafa related in his history that when al-Mahdī saw that the unanimous opinion of his household favored designating [his son] as successor, he resolved to remove ʿĪsā and called upon them to pledge allegiance to Mūsā. ʿĪsā refused to relinquish his position, claiming that he was bound by oaths that would divest him of his possessions and divorce his wives. Al-Mahdī therefore summoned Ibn ʿUlātha, Muslim ibn Khālid al-Zanjī, and a group of jurists, who gave ʿĪsā a legal opinion providing him a way out of his oath. He received compensation for what his oath would require of him [in the form of a large sum of money, which he mentioned]. Al-Mahdī continued pressing him until he relinquished his position, whereupon allegiance was pledged to al-Mahdī and, after him, to Mūsā al-Hādī.

As for Abū Thawr, he held that when manumission is made conditional by way of an oath, expiation for an oath suffices, just as with a vow made out of obstinacy or anger. His basis was the previously cited report concerning Laylā bint al-ʿAjmāʾ, to whom ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿUmar, Hafsa, Mother of the Believers, and Zaynab, the stepdaughter of the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), gave the ruling that she should offer expiation for an oath when she said, “If I do not separate you from your wife, every slave I own is emancipated.” This incident is among the proofs relied upon by jurists in the question of vows made out of obstinacy or anger. Ahmad and Abū ʿUbayd, however, withheld judgment concerning manumission in this case because of the distinction I have mentioned, and Ahmad contested that argument.

As for divorce, no report concerning it had reached Abū Thawr, so he withheld judgment on it, even though