Likewise, a further implication of this principle is that if someone vows to commit a sin or perform a permissible act, he has thereby sworn to do it, just as if he had said, “By Allah, I shall certainly do such-and-such.” If he swore by Allah that he would commit a sin or perform a permissible act, he would be liable for expiation for an oath. The same therefore applies if he says, “I owe it to Allah to do such-and-such.”

Some jurists, both among our companions and others, distinguish between the two categories.

[Section: Oaths Invoking Divorce or Manumission in Cases of Obstinacy and Anger]

Section

As for an oath invoking divorce or manumission in cases of obstinacy and anger, an example is when the speaker intends thereby to urge or prevent something, or to affirm or deny a claim, as when he says, “Divorce shall be binding upon me: I shall certainly do such-and-such,” or, “I shall not do such-and-such”; or, “If I do such-and-such, my slaves are free”; or, “If I do not do it, my slaves are free.” Thus, whoever among the jurists maintains