the Lawgiver seeks to promote, that distinction is weak. Some forms of charitable giving are superior to emancipation. Indeed, supporting a needy relative is superior, as Ahmad explicitly stated. For it is reported: “Maymūna, the wife of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), emancipated a slave woman she owned. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said, ‘Had you kept her for your maternal uncles, it would have been better for you.’” Accordingly, if a deceased person had relatives who were not among his heirs, making a bequest to them would take precedence over making a bequest to emancipate a slave. I know of no disagreement concerning this. I know only of disagreement over whether a bequest to such relatives is obligatory. There are two reports from Ahmad. The first holds that it is obligatory, as maintained by a group of early and later scholars. The second holds that it is not obligatory, as maintained by the three jurists and others. If he makes a bequest to someone else to their exclusion, is that bequest [redirected] to his relatives rather than the legatee, or is one-third of it given to the legatee and two-thirds to his relatives, just as the estate is divided between the heirs and the legatee? There are two reports from Ahmad. The well-known position among most of his followers, however, is that the bequest takes effect. Thus, if some forms of charitable giving are superior to emancipation, that distinction cannot be justified by claiming that emancipation alone enjoys a higher degree of merit.

Moreover, what the purchaser is required to do by stipulation may be of greater merit. For example, the purchaser may owe an obligation to Allah—such as zakat, an expiation, or a vow—or a debt to another person, and it may be stipulated that he discharge it from the item sold. Alternatively, the purchaser may stipulate that the seller discharge from the purchase price a debt that he owes, or the like. Such a condition is more compelling than one requiring emancipation.

As for emancipation extending to the remaining shares, its purpose is simply to make the slave fully free. An analogous rule has been prescribed in matters of property: the right of pre-emption. It was prescribed to make ownership complete [for the pre-emptor], because co-ownership causes harm. We maintain that such a rule has been prescribed in all forms of