[al-Nisā’: 24], and His statement: “Marry those women who please you” [al-Nisā’: 3] [al-Nisā’: 3]. This universal ruling remains in force whether or not this particular sale occurs. When a particular sale occurs, it establishes a particular right of ownership. This particular right is caused by the servant’s act. If the servant terminates it, he terminates only what he himself established through his act, not what Allah established as the [universal ruling, since what Allah established as the] particular ruling merely follows from the servant’s act as its cause; the Lawgiver did not institute it independently.

Some people have imagined that extinguishing rights by means of contracts and rescissions is like abrogating legal rulings, but that is not so. An abstract ruling can be revoked only by the One who instituted it, namely the Lawgiver. As for this particular right, it exists only because the servant brought it within the abstract ruling. Since it is up to him to bring it within that ruling, it is likewise up to him to remove it from it. The Lawgiver has never issued a ruling about it as an individual case, such as saying, “Sell this garment or do not sell it,” or, “Give it away or do not give it away.” Rather, [His ruling] concerns the abstract category, so that when a particular case is brought within it, the ruling applies to that particular case.

Reflect carefully upon this, and distinguish between changing the specific, particular ruling that the servant established by bringing the case within the abstract ruling, and changing the general ruling instituted by the Lawgiver whenever its cause arises through the servant’s act. Once it is clear that no contracts are prohibited except those prohibited by the Lawgiver, it follows that honoring them is obligatory because the Lawgiver has categorically commanded that they be honored, except where evidence establishes an exception. Moreover, honoring contracts is among the obligations upon which all religious communities—and indeed all rational people—agree. Those who hold that reason itself can establish obligations have therefore classed honoring them among rational obligations. Thus, entering into contracts in the first place is prohibited only when the Lawgiver prohibits it, whereas honoring them is obligatory because the Lawgiver has made it so and because reason itself also requires it.