Al-Qawa'id al-NuraniyyaIbn Taimiya

will Allah accept from him any obligatory or voluntary deed.” Allah also abolished the pre-Islamic practices of a man taking another man’s son as his own and of an emancipated slave ascribing his clientage to someone other than his emancipator. Such acts are impermissible regardless of any stipulation, and a stipulation cannot render permissible what was forbidden. By contrast, a stipulation makes obligatory what was permissible without it, such as an increase in the dowry or price, the provision of collateral, or delaying collection. A man may give additional wealth to a woman, voluntarily furnish collateral, grant an extension, and do similar things. If any of these is stipulated, it becomes obligatory. Once it becomes obligatory, a demand that had been lawful without it becomes forbidden, for demanding payment was not lawful simply because there was no stipulation. The Lawgiver did not permit demanding payment from a debtor without qualification. Thus, a condition does not alter what is lawful or forbidden without qualification.

As for what Allah has permitted only in a particular situation, and not without qualification, if a condition moves it beyond that situation, the condition cannot be said to have forbidden what Allah made lawful. Likewise, when Allah has forbidden something only in a particular situation, and not without qualification, the condition cannot be said to have permitted what Allah forbade. This is so even though, in the absence of a condition, the ruling of permissibility or prohibition would be presumed to continue. There is, however, a difference between permissibility and prohibition being established by an explicit revealed pronouncement and their being established solely through the presumption of continuity.

A contract or condition therefore overrides what the presumption of continuity entails, but it does not override what the Lawgiver’s pronouncement has established. The reports from the Companions accord with this, as Umar—may Allah be pleased with him—said: “Rights are [decisively settled] by stipulated conditions.”

يَقْبَلُ اللَّهُ مِنْهُ صَرْفًا وَلَا عَدْلًا» ، وَأَبْطَلَ اللَّهُ مَا كَانُوا عَلَيْهِ فِي الْجَاهِلِيَّةِ مِنْ تَبَنِّي الرَّجُلِ ابْنَ غَيْرِهِ، وَانْتِسَابِ الْمُعْتَقِ إِلَى غَيْرِ مَوْلَاهُ. فَهَذَا أَمْرٌ لَا يَجُوزُ فِعْلُهُ بِغَيْرِ شَرْطٍ، فَلَا يُبِيحُ الشَّرْطُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَ حَرَامًا، وَأَمَّا مَا كَانَ مُبَاحًا بِدُونِ الشَّرْطِ فَالشَّرْطُ يُوجِبُهُ، كَالزِّيَادَةِ فِي الْمَهْرِ وَالثَّمَنِ وَالرَّهْنِ وَتَأْخِيرِ الِاسْتِيفَاءِ. فَإِنَّ الرَّجُلَ لَهُ أَنْ يُعْطِيَ الْمَرْأَةَ، وَلَهُ أَنْ يَتَبَرَّعَ بِالرَّهْنِ وَبِالْإِنْظَارِ، وَنَحْوِ ذَلِكَ، فَإِذَا شَرَطَهُ صَارَ وَاجِبًا، وَإِذَا وَجَبَ فَقَدْ حَرُمَتِ الْمُطَالَبَةُ الَّتِي كَانَتْ حَلَالًا بِدُونِهِ، لِأَنَّ الْمُطَالَبَةَ لَمْ تَكُنْ حَلَالًا مَعَ عَدَمِ الشَّرْطِ. فَإِنَّ الشَّارِعَ لَمْ يُبِحْ مُطَالَبَةَ الْمَدِينِ مُطْلَقًا فَمَا كَانَ حَلَالًا وَحَرَامًا مُطْلَقًا فَالشَّرْطُ لَا يُغَيِّرُهُ. وَأَمَّا مَا أَبَاحَهُ اللَّهُ فِي حَالٍ مَخْصُوصَةٍ وَلَمْ يُبِحْهُ مُطْلَقًا، فَإِذَا حَوَّلَهُ الشَّرْطُ عَنْ تِلْكَ الْحَالِ لَمْ يَكُنِ الشَّرْطُ قَدْ حَرَّمَ مَا أَحَلَّهُ اللَّهُ، وَكَذَلِكَ مَا حَرَّمَهُ اللَّهُ فِي حَالٍ مَخْصُوصَةٍ، وَلَمْ يُحَرِّمْهُ مُطْلَقًا لَمْ يَكُنِ الشَّرْطُ قَدْ أَبَاحَ مَا حَرَّمَهُ اللَّهُ، وَإِنْ كَانَ بِدُونِ الشَّرْطِ يُسْتَصْحَبُ حُكْمُ الْإِبَاحَةِ وَالتَّحْرِيمِ، لَكِنْ فَرْقٌ بَيْنَ ثُبُوتِ الْإِبَاحَةِ وَالتَّحْرِيمِ بِالْخِطَابِ، وَبَيْنَ ثُبُوتِهِ بِمُجَرَّدِ الِاسْتِصْحَابِ. فَالْعَقْدُ وَالشَّرْطُ يَرْفَعُ مُوجَبَ الِاسْتِصْحَابِ لَكِنْ لَا يَرْفَعُ مَا أَوْجَبَهُ كَلَامُ الشَّارِعِ، وَآثَارُ الصَّحَابَةِ تُوَافِقُ ذَلِكَ كَمَا قَالَ عمر ﵁: " [مَقَاطِعُ] الْحُقُوقِ عِنْدَ الشُّرُوطِ ".

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