and the ijārah contract is binding. This is the form of ijārah that resembles a sale in most of its rulings. When later jurists use the term ijārah without qualification, or speak of “the chapter on ijārah,” this is the sense they intend.

Accordingly, orchard tending, sharecropping, profit sharing, and similar partnerships in proceeds yet to be produced may correctly be described as ijārah in its broadest or general sense. Anyone who describes them as ijārah in its specific sense, however, is mistaken. When an arrangement is ijārah in the general sense—that is, a reward contract—then if the consideration is guaranteed, whether as an item of property or a debt, it must be known. If, however, the consideration is drawn from what the work itself produces, it may be an undivided share thereof. This is like a commander saying during a military expedition, “Whoever directs us to such-and-such a fortress shall receive such-and-such from it.” Receipt of the reward is then contingent upon the acquisition of the property, even though this is purely a reward contract involving no partnership. A partnership is all the more deserving of this ruling.

Another approach may also be taken. It may be said that analogy based on established legal principles indicates that, in ijārah in its specific sense, the consideration must not involve prohibited uncertainty, by analogy with the price in a sale. By contrast, the general form of ijārah, in which the benefit need not be known, does not resemble this form of ijārah, for the reasons already given. It may therefore not be assimilated to it and remains governed by the original presumption of permissibility.

To state the issue precisely: anyone who maintains that the arrangement is ijārah must be asked what he means by ijārah. If he means it in the specific sense, his claim is incorrect. If he means it in the general sense, then where is the proof that it is unlawful unless the consideration is known? If he cites an analogy, the distinction will be explained to him—a distinction obvious even to a non-jurist, let alone a jurist. He will never find any general principle that encompasses this kind of ijārah. When the evidence for prohibition is absent, permissibility is established.

Yet another approach may be taken, namely inverse analogy. It consists in establishing that