Even if it were conceded that there is a difference between this arrangement and a profit-sharing partnership, there can be no doubt that it resembles profit-sharing far more closely than it resembles a contract of hire. In a contract of hire, the work itself is the intended object and must be specified, while the remuneration is either owed as a liability or consists of a specifically designated asset. Here, however, the only intended outcome is the increase; the work need not be specified, and the compensation is neither a designated asset nor an obligation owed, but rather a share of whatever increase is produced. This is why the contract becomes invalid whenever anything fixed is stipulated in it, just as a profit-sharing partnership becomes invalid if the parties stipulate for either of them a fixed amount of profit or a specified remuneration owed as a liability. This is perfectly clear. Since this arrangement is far more like a profit-sharing partnership than a contract of hire, the difference between it and profit-sharing is slight, while the distinctions between the two, on the one hand, and hiring, on the other, have no consequence in law or reason. As it must be assimilated to one of these two legal models, it is more appropriate to assimilate it to the one it most closely resembles. This is too clear to require elaboration.

The third line of reasoning is that the term ijārah has both general and specific applications, falling into three levels:

The first is its application to anyone who provides a benefit in exchange for consideration. The bridal dower is included under this usage, as in the words of Allah Most High: “So for whatever you enjoy through marriage from them, give them their due compensation” [Women 4:24]. It makes no difference whether the work in such a case is known or unknown, or whether the consideration is known or unknown, binding or nonbinding.

The second level is the form of ijārah known as a reward contract: the service to be rendered is unspecified, but the consideration is guaranteed. It is therefore a revocable, nonbinding contract, as when someone says, “Whoever returns my slave to me will receive such-and-such.” He may be returned by someone who is far away or by someone nearby.

The third is ijārah in its specific sense: one leases an asset or hires someone to perform work assumed as an obligation, with the usufruct or service being specified. The compensation is then known,