This nuanced distinction in the disagreement over whether the necessary implication of a position is itself part of that position is better than affirming either alternative without qualification. Any necessary implication that the proponent would accept once it became clear to him is indeed his position; whatever he would not accept is not his position, even if this leaves him inconsistent. This is the distinction between a necessary implication that must be accepted when it follows and one whose entailment requires the proposition entailing it to be abandoned. Once this is understood, one can distinguish between positions that ought to be held and those that are in fact held. This applies to necessary implications whose entailment the proponent has not explicitly denied.

If, however, he himself denies the entailment, the necessary implication may under no circumstances be attributed to him. Otherwise, every scholar would be credited with whatever we believe the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—to have said, merely because the scholar accepts the truth of his message. Since a scholar is not credited with what he denies the Messenger ever said—even though accepting it would be incumbent upon him if the Messenger did say it—the distinction becomes clear between an implication he has not denied and one he has denied. Nor does his explicit statement of a ruling necessarily mean that he denies the entailment of what follows from it, for the two positions may have resulted from two separate exercises of independent reasoning at different times.

The reason for distinguishing the people of knowledge from the adherents of caprice—even though inconsistency occurs in the statements of both—is that the scholar has done what he was commanded to do by maintaining a sound intention and exercising independent reasoning. Outwardly, he is required to believe what the evidence available to him establishes, even if it does not correspond to reality, though this belief is not held with certainty. Similarly, a judge is required to accept the testimony of two upright witnesses, even if, in reality, they are mistaken or lying. Likewise, a mufti is required to accept the report of a reliable and accurate informant or to follow what is outwardly apparent; he consequently believes what that evidence indicates, even if his belief does not correspond to reality. Thus, the belief required of Allah’s servants is that which is supported by the preponderance of probability and which they are commanded to hold, even though it may not correspond to reality; yet in the reality of the matter they are never commanded to hold a belief that does not correspond to reality.

Accordingly, if a scholar holds two contradictory beliefs concerning one issue or two issues, while