of legal accountability; Hajj therefore remains a debt he must fulfill.

Human actions are Allah’s creation, while their acquisition belongs to the servants. The entrance of the prayer time, for instance, renders the prayer obligatory for the legally responsible person, but carrying it out is tied to whatever capability he possesses. A sick person prays standing; if he cannot, then sitting; and if he still cannot, then lying on his side. In every case the prayer is still binding, because he has the preparatory ability. The ability that accompanies performance, however, may be totally absent, or partially present; hence he must perform the act to the extent of his capacity. “So fear Allah as much as you are able” (64:16), and “Allah does not burden any soul beyond its capacity” (2:286).

There is a clear distinction between these two kinds of ability. The first—capacity—is the basis of the divine address, as in the verse, “Allah does not burden any soul beyond its capacity” (2:286); the second concerns the actual execution of the deed.

This question has long been a point of contention and a cause of slips and confusions: are human acts created by Allah, or are they created by the servants themselves?

The first opinion, held by the Jabariyyah and the Jahmiyyah, is that the servant is compelled and has no real part in his actions; they are purely the creation of Allah. According to them, even the prayer a person performs is not by his own choice—he is forced. These groups have gone to excess in affirming Allah’s omnipotence. Their claim is manifest error, for it would entail that Allah wrongs His servants by punishing them for something