has successive members may be said not to exist, because the past is nonexistent and the future is nonexistent. For this reason, some permitted infinity in this case but not in the other. A distinction was also drawn between the past and the future, because the past has entered into existence, unlike the future. A third position distinguished between that whose members coexist and have an ordered arrangement, such as a body, and that which lacks one of these features, such as souls and motions.

That being so, if someone says, “The aggregate is contingent and is an effect of its individual members,” then, if the aggregate here consisted of members coexisting at one time, the matter would be clearer in its case than in that of successive members, which neither coexist nor come together at a single time. Causes and effects can only coexist; they cannot occur successively.

The point, however, is that what he adduces covers both categories, so if they were assumed to be successive, it would still apply to them.

Al-Āmidī based his principal argument for denying the finitude of causes and effects on the following statement:

“The more plausible approach here is to say that, if the causes and effects were infinite, and each of them were contingent, as contemplated here, then they would be either successive