accidents. Whatever depends on any contingent thing cannot be necessary in itself. Thus, whatever depends on each and every contingent thing is itself contingent. Nothing contingent in itself exists except through something else; none of these things has come into existence except through something else. A contingent thing cannot exist through a merely contingent thing, for what is contingent does not exist of itself; all the more, nothing else can exist through it. This is the meaning of their statement:

“Whatever depends on something contingent is all the more clearly contingent.”

[The third response]

It may be said:

The whole is either distinct from each and every individual member, or it is not.

If it is not distinct, this objection falls away, and there is no whole apart from the individual contingent members. If it is distinct from them, it is their effect, and the effect of something contingent is all the more clearly contingent.

This is the meaning of Ibn Sīnā’s statement: “If the whole requires no cause whatsoever—that is, if it does not entail a cause that necessitates the whole—it would be necessary and unknown. Yet how could this be, when it is necessary only through its individual members?”

He means: it is not necessary in itself, but only through its individual members; whatever is necessary through something else is not necessary in itself.

[Al-Āmidī’s remarks in the introduction to Abkār al-Afkār]

This can be clarified by examining al-Āmidī’s wording, where he says, “This is a difficult problem; perhaps someone other than myself has its solution,” even though he greatly esteems the subjects he discusses