of a constituted whole. Otherwise, it would be valid to say that an infinite collection can come into existence in its entirety because each individual member can come into existence. Possibility would thus be predicated of the whole just as it is predicated of each individual.”

[The words of al-Suhrawardī]

Likewise, al-Suhrawardī said:

“One cannot predicate of the whole what is predicated of each individual. Every possible thing other than motion can come about all at once, but this is not true of all such things together. Each of two contraries can exist in a subject, but both together cannot.”

[Responses to this argument from several perspectives]

The first response

It may be said:

The combination itself cannot be necessary in itself without its parts. The falsity of this is self-evident, and no one has maintained it. How could it be so, when the combination is an accident that depends on its subject? If the subject of an accident is not necessary in itself, then the accident, which depends on something contingent in itself, is all the more clearly contingent and not necessary in itself. Its necessity can only be imagined as deriving from its contingent parts. In that case, the combination would be contingent in itself and necessary through its parts. If it is contingent in itself, then the very