its individual members. Thus, both objections claim only that it is necessary through its individual members; neither claims any necessity in itself distinct from its necessity through those members. Yet al-Āmidī judged this objection weak when he attributed it to someone else, presenting it in different terms and from a different perspective. He then acknowledged his inability to resolve it when he raised it himself in another formulation and from another perspective.

Those who answer on al-Āmidī’s behalf by distinguishing between the two say: “In the first objection, the aggregate is said to be necessary in itself, in a formulation expressing an impossibility; in this objection, it is said to be contingent, becoming necessary through its individual members.”

This answer, based on distinguishing between the two, is weak. For to say, “It is contingent but necessary through its individual members,” is to say that it is necessary through those members, all of which are contingent. The effect of something contingent is all the more clearly contingent. Hence, the effect of a contingent thing cannot exist before that contingent thing becomes necessary, and a contingent thing becomes necessary only through that which is necessary in itself. Indeed, anything for whose existence even one contingent thing forms part of the cause is itself contingent. How much more so, then, if each of infinitely many contingent things forms part of the cause