He said:
“What prevents the aggregate from being contingent in existence, with its existence determined by that of its individual members, and the existence of each individual member determined by another, without end?”

He said:
“This is a knotty difficulty; perhaps someone other than me has its solution.”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary on al-Āmidī’s statement]

One might say:
If calling the aggregate contingent means that it is contingent rather than necessary, and thus depends on something outside itself, this entails its dependence on something else—which is what is to be established.

If, however, it means that the aggregate is contingent in itself but necessary through an endless succession of individual members, then this objection amounts to the same as the preceding one. The only difference is that the first asks:
“Why should it not be necessary in itself, meaning that it does not depend on anything outside its individual members, but rather that the aggregate is necessary through its contingent individual members?”

The second asks:
“Why should it not be contingent in itself, yet necessary through its individual members in an endless succession?”

Yet it may be said that, on one interpretation, he claimed that the combined configuration is necessary in itself despite the contingency of its individual members, whereas on the second, he claimed that the combined configuration is contingent