contingent, it would be necessary in itself, and it is the aggregate of the individual members. Each individual member is contingent, so the aggregate is likewise contingent in itself; what is necessary in itself cannot be contingent in itself.”

I say:
This objection admits of three interpretations.

The first is to say that the aggregate owes its necessity to both the individual members and their combination. It is known that the aggregate consists of the individual members and their combination. If these are contingent, then the entity itself is contingent. The objection would therefore fail, as al-Āmidī said.

The second is to say that the aggregate is necessary through its contingent individual members, without treating the aggregate itself as contingent. Rather, it is said that the aggregate is necessary through its contingent individual members. This is the objection intended by someone who understands what he is saying. Its answer will follow: the combination of contingent beings has even greater reason to be contingent, since it is an accident of those beings, and an accident depends on the entities in which it occurs. If they are contingent, it has even greater reason to be contingent—along with other considerations.

The third possibility is to say that each individual member has its existence determined by another, and that the aggregate is also contingent, but its existence is determined through that of the successive individual members.

Al-Āmidī mentioned this objection, raising it against this argument in his book entitled Daqā’iq al-haqā’iq.