its individual members were contingent, whereas they have been said to be contingent.” He said: “Furthermore, even if it is necessary, that—despite its impossibility—is precisely what is to be established.”

This second formulation he mentions constitutes a third formulation. It does not establish the intended conclusion, since it would not then follow that there exists a being necessary in itself outside the aggregate of contingent beings.

[Al-Āmidī’s discussion in Daqā’iq al-haqā’iq]

Some have raised an objection to this, saying:
“If the individual members are contingent, meaning that each depends on its cause, and the aggregate consists of all these members, nothing prevents describing it as necessary and non-contingent, in the sense that it does not depend on anything outside itself, even though some of its constituent parts depend on others.”

Al-Āmidī said:
“This objection fails, for if the aggregate is not