and which is the other of al-Rāzī’s two views, is that its nonexistence does not require a cause to render it nonexistent. Sheer nonexistence is neither explained by a cause nor used as a causal explanation, since continuous sheer nonexistence requires neither an agent nor a cause. Rather, the absence of its cause entails its nonexistence and serves as evidence of it. If, therefore, “the cause of its nonexistence” means something that entails its nonexistence and indicates it, this is correct. But if it means a realized nonexistence whose realization requires a cause that necessitates it, this is not so, for continuous nonexistence requires no cause that necessitates it.

Thus, saying, “A contingent being cannot exist without a determining factor,” is equivalent to saying, “It does not exist of itself; it exists only through something other than itself.” There is no need to say, “Whatever does not exist of itself can be nonexistent only through something other than itself,” for whatever does not exist of itself has no existence of its own.

If you say, “Nonexistence belongs to it of itself,” this has two meanings. If you mean that its essence entails nonexistence and cannot admit existence, this is not so; rather, it can admit existence. But if you mean that its essence does not entail existence, that it has nothing of itself but nonexistence, and that its existence can come only from something other than itself, not from itself, then this is correct. There is thus a clear distinction between its having nothing of itself but nonexistence and its essence entailing nonexistence, although when we say:

“It has