Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

being contingent and admitting both existence and nonexistence, does not exist. Thus, everything postulated consists solely of nonexistent things.

[Third]
The third response makes this clear:

We say: what someone calls “a contingent being that has not come into existence” is nonexistent; it does not exist at all. Whatever is nonexistent and has not acquired anything necessitating its existence remains continually nonexistent.

If someone says, “Neither of a contingent being’s two alternatives can prevail over the other without a determining factor,” this is clear and evident with regard to existence: it cannot exist without something necessitating its existence, since it has no existence of itself.

As regards nonexistence, however, some say, “The cause of its nonexistence is the absence of the cause of its existence.” They thus assign a cause to its nonexistence just as they assign a cause to its existence. This is the view of Ibn Sīnā and his followers.

The correct conclusion, held by most speculative thinkers among the theologians and philosophers,

كونه ممكناً يقبل الوجود والعدم ليس موجود فكل ما قدر إنما هي معدومات. [الثالث] يوضح هذا الجواب الثالث: وهو أن نقول: قول القائل: الممكن الذي لم يوجد هو معدوم ليس بموجود أصلاً والمعدوم الذي لم يحصل له ما يقتضي وجوده هو باق مستمر على العدم. وإذا قال القائل: الممكن لا يترجح أحد طرفيه على الآخر إلا بمرجح فهذا بين ظاهر في جاب الإثبات فإنه لا يكون موجوداً إلا بمقتضي لوجوده إذا كان ليس له من نفسه وجود. وأما في النفي فمن الناس من يقول: علة عدمه عدم علة وجوده ويجعل لعدمه علة كما لوجوده علة وهذا قول ابن سينا وأتباعه والتحقيق الذي عليه جمهور النظار من المتكلمين والمتفلسفين.

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