of them neither exists through itself nor exerts causal influence through itself, then each would, of itself, have neither existence nor causal influence. We would thus have postulated an endless series of things, each of which has neither existence nor causal influence through itself, with nothing distinct from them that exists and exerts causal influence upon them. There would therefore be neither existence nor causal influence whatsoever.

If someone says:
“Each of these things that do not exist through themselves originates another that does not exist through itself,” sound reason would reply: “Whatever does not exist through itself cannot exert causal influence through itself. How, then, can you make it exert causal influence upon another when it has no reality?”

If he says:
“Rather, it has real existence through that other,”

he is told:
“There is no other through which it can acquire real existence. For the other you have postulated likewise has neither existence nor causal influence at all, except through yet another that you postulate, which itself has neither existence nor causal influence.”

The crux of this response is that for reason to posit something as a causally effective originator of another, when it does not yet exist through itself and its existence through another has not been established, is among the most invalid and untenable suppositions. For it can originate another only after it exists, yet it, despite