also contingent in itself, a fortiori. Thus both the parts and the configuration of their assembly are contingent in themselves, so it is impossible for anything there to be posited as necessary in itself.

Moreover, an attribute possessed by the individual members may or may not be possessed by the whole. If the individuals possess it because of a nature shared by them and the whole, then the whole must possess it as well. This differs from a case in which composition gives the whole an attribute absent from the individuals.

It is evident that if each individual exists only through another and is needy and dependent, multiplying such needy, dependent things and bringing them together cannot make them self-sufficient unless some assist others. Two weak individuals, for example, gain strength by coming together, because each is independent of the other in one respect and dependent upon the other in another respect. But if each is assumed to depend upon the other in every respect, it is impossible for their coming together to give them strength, or for either to assist the other, since the assumption is that neither has anything except from the other. This is circular dependence involving causal priority—the circular dependence of agents and of efficient and final causes—so neither obtains anything from the other