dependent on knowledge of that general, universal proposition; rather, these specific, particular propositions are dependent on knowledge of that general, universal proposition; rather, these particular propositions may occur naturally to him before he becomes aware of those universal propositions. This is like his knowledge that writing requires a writer and a building requires a builder: when he sees a particular piece of writing, he knows that it must have a writer.

When he sees a building, he knows that it must have a builder, even if he is not, at that moment, conscious of every instance of writing that has existed, will exist, or could exist. Thus, you find that a child or someone like him knows these particular, singular propositions, even though his mind does not call to mind the general, universal proposition. Likewise, a person knows that this particular thing cannot be both black and white, or be in two places, even without calling to mind that blackness and whiteness cannot coexist, or that two bodies cannot occupy the same place. Similarly, when he sees a dirham and half a dirham, he knows that this whole is greater than this part, even without calling to mind that every whole must be greater than its part.

Likewise, if he is told:

“This first number is equal to this second number, and this second number is equal to this third number,”

he knows that the first is equal to what equals the second, and that it is equal to the third, even without calling to mind that anything equal to something that is equal to another thing is itself equal to that other thing.