[Abū al-Qāsim al-Ansārī’s Words]
Abū al-Qāsim al-Ansārī, the commentator on al-Irshād, said:

“Even if al-Qādī Abū Bakr affirmed states, he did not regard existence as a state, for knowledge of it is knowledge of the essence. According to Abū Hāshim and his followers, existence is one of the states and results from the agent’s being powerful.”

He said:

“As for Imām al-Haramayn’s statement that the leading scholars use the term ‘attributes’ broadly when counting existence among them, they said this only because, as we have explained, an attribute of the essence conveys, according to them, what the essence itself conveys. Thus, there is no difference between a substance’s existence and its occupying space.

“Al-Kiyā likewise said, ‘Existence is comparable to a substance’s occupying space, for a substance’s occupying space is the substance itself,’ thereby differing from Abū al-Ma‘ālī.”

He said:

“Among the proofs of the Maker’s existence is that He possesses attributes subsisting in Him, such as life, power, knowledge, and the like. These attributes require the existence of that in which they subsist. Something may exist without possessing these attributes, but it is impossible to possess them without actually existing.”

He said:

“Further confirmation of what we have said is the decisive proof that He is an agent, and an agent must exist.”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Comment]
I say:

This second argument is what Abū al-Ma‘ālī mentioned: affirming the Maker affirms His existence; otherwise, a nonexistent Maker amounts to denying the Maker. As for the first argument, although it is sound, its conclusion is clearer than its premises. Knowing that the Maker can only be existent is clearer than knowing that that in which an attribute subsists can only be