the conclusion is clearer to the mind than the premises, so this is like proving what is more evident by means of what is less evident. Although many people condemn this without qualification, it may be useful in certain circumstances: for instance, when an obstinate opponent disputes an evident premise but accepts one less evident than it. It may also enable someone to acquire knowledge through subtle, obscure, lengthy methods when he regards knowledge acquired in this way as more valuable and desirable, and feels that being addressed with clear proofs familiar to ordinary people would give him no distinction over them. Such methods may also be used to show someone that these approaches are familiar and known to us: we have not abandoned them out of inability or ignorance, but have turned away from them because better approaches suffice, and because we occupy ourselves with what is more beneficial than unnecessary elaboration. There are other similar purposes as well.

As for the proposition that whatever comes into being must have an agent to bring it into being, this is self-evident to the great majority of scholars. Many Muʿtazilī speculative theologians and their followers, however, have treated it as requiring inferential proof, as will be discussed later.

As for the proposition that something nonexistent cannot be the agent that brings existing things into being, this is even more evident. Thus, even those who offered proofs that whatever is brought into being must have an existing agent to bring it into being, and that every contingent being must have an existing cause—such as al-Rāzī and others—acknowledged that this is self-evident.