and it therefore follows that some existing things exist through themselves, which is what was to be established.

If, however, you consider this with respect to the totality, the totality of existing things cannot be necessarily existent through itself. Some of its parts are contingent and have been brought into existence, having come to be after not existing. The totality depends upon them, and whatever depends upon something contingent cannot be necessarily existent through itself. Nor can the totality depend upon something other than itself and separate from it, for that could only be nonexistent. An existing thing cannot depend upon a nonexistent agent—one that does not exist—much less can the totality of existing things do so.

It therefore follows that the totality depends upon something within it. That part can only be necessarily existent through itself, since, if it were not, it would be contingent and dependent upon another. Thus, the totality of individual existing things would depend upon another; and that other—the totality of contingent things—is not dependent upon something that is merely a part of the contingent things. Their combined totality is greater than some of its parts, and that part shares the totality’s dependence upon and need for another. It has the same need for and dependence upon another that the totality has, while the totality is greater than it. Thus, if all the parts are dependent and in need, and the totality is likewise dependent and in need, no part could exist through the totality alone, much less through another part, and still less could the totality, all of whose parts are dependent, exist through one of those