knowledge of revelation, whereas what conflicts with revelation contradicts it and is incompatible with it.
Would any rational person say that establishing what necessarily accompanies something entails establishing what contradicts and opposes it?!
Yet the proponent of this view has treated all rational claims as a single category, alike in their soundness or invalidity. It is well known that revelation entails the soundness only of those rational claims that necessarily accompany it, not of those incompatible with it. People agree that, among what are called rational claims, some are true and others false. Whatever is both a prerequisite for knowledge of revelation and sufficient to establish it is necessary for that knowledge. This is unlike what is incompatible with revelation and contradicts it: that very thing cannot possibly be a condition of revelation’s soundness and necessarily accompany its truth, for what necessarily accompanies something cannot contradict it. Thus, giving precedence to revelation over what is said to be rational does not, as a general rule, entail undermining revelation’s foundation.
These three arguments have therefore shown the invalidity of the three premises upon which they based their preference for their own opinions over the words of Allah and His Messenger.
[Objection: We give precedence over revelation to the rational truths through which we came to know that revelation is true. The response to them has several aspects. The first]
Objection:
We give precedence over revelation to the rational truths through which we came to know that revelation is true.
The response to them has several aspects.
The first
If it is said, “We give precedence over revelation only to the rational truths through which we came to know that revelation is true,” the reply is:
We shall explain, Allah willing, that nothing among the rational claims that conflict with revelation is something upon which revelation depends. Hence, whatever conflicts with revelation—even if it is called rational—is not a foundation of revelation upon which knowledge of its truth depends. Thus, refuting any such rational claim does not undermine the foundation of revelation.
[The second]
The second argument:
The great majority of people acknowledge that knowledge of the Creator and of the Messenger’s truthfulness does not depend upon the rational claims asserted by some that conflict with revelation. Those who formulated this rule—such as Abū Hāmid, al-Rāzī, and others—acknowledge that knowledge of the Messenger’s truthfulness