or by one of them. If it is determined by one of them, the consequence we have shown to follow is unavoidable. If it is determined by all the individual members taken together, this is precisely the rejected totality itself; it would thus involve a thing determining itself, which is impossible.”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Commentary]

This is what he stated in his well-known book Abkār al-Afkār, a work on speculative theology. This argument does not address the refutation of an infinite number of coexisting contingent causes and effects; rather, it establishes a Necessary Existent outside them. Some speculative theologians, such as the followers of Muʿammar, have affirmed an infinite number of coexisting maʿānī, which constitute creation and are a condition for coming into being.

Then, in his philosophical work entitled Daqāʾiq al-Haqāʾiq, he presented this argument and added a refutation of the affirmation of an infinite number of causes and effects. However, he raised an objection to the argument and stated that he had no answer to it. His argument for establishing a Necessary Existent therefore remained dependent upon an answer to this objection.

After repeating what he had stated here, he said:

“The totality, considered in itself, must be either necessary or contingent. If its individual members are contingent—meaning that each depends upon its cause—and the totality is the aggregate of those members, there is nothing to prevent describing it as necessary and non-contingent, in the sense that it is not